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The Constitutional Status of the
Supreme Court of Canada
Warren J. Newman

I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court of Canada stands at the apex of the judicial
system in this country.1 The Supreme Court is the head of the judicial
branch of government and the final arbiter of legal disputes. Its authority
is paramount in the interpretation of law, and particularly, the supreme
law, the Constitution of Canada. It is, as Professor Stephen Scott has
emphasized, “an institution of inestimable significance. So too, therefore,
is the law dealing with the Court‟s constitution, organization and
jurisdiction”.2
However, unlike the Parliament of Canada, which was established by
the Constitution Act, 1867,3 the Supreme Court was not created by the
Constitution of Canada; only its eventual existence was contemplated by
that Act. Section 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867 granted to Parliament
the power to provide for the “Constitution, Maintenance, and Organization”
of what was termed “a General Court of Appeal for Canada”, as well as
for the establishment of additional courts “for the better Administration



Dip.C.S., B.A., B.C.L., LL.B. (McGill), LL.M. (Osgoode); Ad. E.; of the Bars of Quebec
and Ontario; Senior General Counsel, Constitutional and Administrative Law Section, Department
of Justice of Canada. The views expressed in this paper are meant to stimulate reflection and debate,
in the context of an academic conference. They do not necessarily represent the position of the
Department of Justice or the Government of Canada.
1
For discussion, see “The Supreme Court of Canada and the Canadian Court System”, in
W.J. Newman, “Adjudicating Divisions of Powers Issues: a Canadian Perspective”, in Andrew Le
Sueur, ed., Building the UK’s New Supreme Court — National and Comparative Perspectives
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), at 115-44; an earlier version of that chapter was published
as a paper in (2003) 21 S.C.L.R. (2d) at 139-79.
2
S.A. Scott, “The Supreme Court of Canada and the 1987 Constitutional Accord”, in RéalA. Forest, ed., L’adhésion du Québec à l’Accord du Lac Meech – Points de vue juridiques et
politiques (Montreal: Les Éditions Thémis, 1987), at 131.
3
(U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3; see s. 17 et seq. of Part IV of the Constitution Act, 1867,
under the rubric, “Legislative Power”.
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of the Laws of Canada”. In 1875, Parliament proceeded by statute to
establish the Supreme Court.4
What, if any, is the constitutional status of the Supreme Court of
Canada? Professor Peter W. Hogg, in his oft-cited treatise, Constitutional
Law of Canada, states that Canadians did not write into the British North
America Act5 “a new supreme court on the model of the Supreme Court
of the United States. The B.N.A. Act, by section 101, gave authority for
such a court to be established, but did not actually establish it.”6
Yet is the position of the United States Supreme Court so entirely
different? Section 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867 may be compared
and contrasted with Article 1, section 1 of the Constitution of the United
States, which provides that “[t]he judicial Power of the United States,
shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.” The Supreme
Court of the United States was effectively established by Congress
through the Judiciary Act of 1789,7 and the composition of the Court was
varied by Congress in 1807, 1837, 1863 and 1869.8
The comparison with the U.S. Supreme Court, although not a perfect
analogy,9 is a useful one because it opens the door to a way of thinking
about the Supreme Court of Canada that may assist us in reconciling
Parliament‟s ongoing power to enact laws — most notably the Supreme
Court Act10 itself and amendments thereto — in relation to the Court,
while at the same time acknowledging the Court‟s pre-eminent role and
position in our judicial system and constitutional framework.

4

Supreme and Exchequer Courts Act, S.C. 1875, c. 11.
Now styled the Constitution Act, 1867, by the schedule to the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
6
P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed. (Scarborough: Thomson Carswell,
2007), ch. 1.2, at 5 [hereinafter “Hogg, Constitutional Law ”].
7
An Act to establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, 1 Stat. 73 (enacted by
Congress on September 24, 1789), provided in s. 1 that “the supreme court of the United States shall
consist of a chief justice and five associate justices, any four of whom shall be a quorum, and shall
hold annually at the seat of government two sessions, the one commencing the first Monday of
February, and the other the first Monday of August. …”
8
The number of Justices was increased from six to seven, then nine, ten, and back to nine;
the latter by the Judiciary Act of 1869.
9
More of the U.S. Supreme Court‟s elements, such as the nomination and appointments
process and judicial tenure are formally entrenched in the Constitution. Another analogy (also
imperfect) is that of the High Court of Australia, in which the judicial power of the Commonwealth
of Australia was vested by the Constitution of 1901, but which was actually established by the
Judiciary Act 1903 enacted by the Parliament of Australia.
10
R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26.
5
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II. THE SUPREME COURT ACT AND THE CONUNDRUM OF THE
AMENDING PROCEDURES
The Supreme Court Act is not one of the Acts listed in the schedule
to the Constitution Act, 1982 and thereby defined, through section 52 of
the latter Act, as forming part of the Constitution of Canada. The
Supreme Court Act was amended in 1987 by an ordinary statute of
Parliament despite the fact, as Professor Hogg points out, that “the
Supreme Court of Canada” is one of the matters expressly listed in
section 42 of the Constitution Act, 1982 as being subject to the general
amending procedure of section 38 (requiring authorizing resolutions of the
Senate, the House of Commons, and the legislative assemblies of twothirds of the provinces representing 50 per cent of the population of the
provinces).11 This is because, as Hogg underlines, unlike the other
matters dealt with in section 42, the Supreme Court is “nowhere provided
for in the Constitution of Canada”.12 Section 42 only applies to
amendments to the Constitution of Canada, and since the Supreme Court
Act is not one of the instruments forming part of the Constitution, it
follows that the Act is still open to ordinary amendment by Parliament
under section 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867. So too, section 41 of the
Constitution Act, 1982 subjects amendments to the Constitution of
Canada in relation to “the composition of the Supreme Court of Canada”
to the unanimity procedure (the approval of the federal Houses and all 10
legislative assemblies), but since amendments to the Supreme Court Act
are not amendments to the Constitution of Canada, it is open to
Parliament to alter the current composition of the Court, as it has done
from time to time in the past:
The amending Act of 1987 did not change the number of judges on the
Court or the requirement that three judges must be appointed from
Quebec, but these are matters provided in the Supreme Court Act, not
the Constitution of Canada, so they too are open to amendment by the
ordinary legislative process, despite the fact that “the composition of
the Supreme Court of Canada” is one of the topics listed in s. 41 as
requiring the unanimity procedure.13

Later in his treatise, Professor Hogg reiterates that the Court was
established by Parliament and that thus “[t]he Supreme Court‟s existence,
11
12
13

Hogg, Constitutional Law, supra, note 6, ch. 4.2(c), at 78.
Id., 4.3(g), at 85.
Id., at 4.2(c).
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and therefore the details of its composition and jurisdiction, depend upon
an ordinary federal statute.”14 He adds: “In theory, the Court could be
abolished by the unilateral action of the federal Parliament.”15
As for the procedures for constitutional amendment set out in Part V
of the Constitution Act, 1982, they appear on their face to do no more
and no less than to provide the means by which the composition
(paragraph 41(d)) and other elements (paragraph 42(1)(d)) of the
Supreme Court may be dealt with in the Constitution of Canada, and this
was certainly the premise of the 1987 Meech Lake and the 1992
Charlottetown Constitutional Accords. Professor Hogg has emphasized
that because of the difficulty of reaching agreement on aspects such as a
provincial role in judicial appointments, “the entrenchment of the Court
was not included in the constitutional proposals that were placed before
the federal Parliament by Prime Minister Trudeau in October 1980 and
the entrenchment of the Court was not included in the settlement that was
approved by all first ministers except for the Premier of Quebec in
November 1981”; the result being that the Constitution Act, 1982 did not
entrench the Supreme Court in the Constitution.16 However, noted
Professor Scott, writing in 1982, “[t]o argue that none of the federal
statute law dealing with the Supreme Court of Canada forms part of the
„Constitution of Canada‟ is to say, in effect, that Parliament may
continue to legislate on the subject exactly as it pleases, and its power
under section 101 to do so cannot be taken away save by the elaborate
methods” set out in Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982. “This”, he
continued, “can scarcely have been what the eight „opposing‟ premiers
had in mind when they signed their „April Accord‟ from which sections
41(d) and 42(1)(d) were taken.”17 Writing five years later, Professor
Hogg declared:
The references to the Supreme Court of Canada in ss. 41(d) and
42(1)(d) of the Constitution Act, 1982 have created an intolerably
14

Id., ch. 8.1, at 240.
Id.; that statement is tempered in two respects: in a footnote, Professor Hogg adverts to
the possibility that “references to the Supreme Court of Canada in ss. 41(d) and 42[1](d) of the
Constitution Act, 1982 have now placed the Court beyond the power of the federal Parliament” (but
this eventuality is discussed and dismissed in his text in Chapter 4) and he continues in the body of
his treatise: “In practice, of course, the Court has won a highly respected place in the scheme of
Canadian government, and no federal government would ever contemplate the abolition or
diminution of the Court.”
16
P.W. Hogg, Meech Lake Constitutional Accord Annotated (Scarborough: Carswell,
1987), at 29-30 [hereinafter “Hogg, Meech Lake”].
17
S.A. Scott, “The Canadian Constitutional Amendment Processes” (1982) 45 Law &
Contemp. Probs. 249, at 261 [hereinafter “Scott, Constitutional Amendment”].
15
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confusing situation. While it is probable that these references are
ineffective as long as the Court is not provided for in the Constitution
of Canada, this is by no means clear; and it is possible that the Supreme
Court Act, or some as yet identified parts of the Supreme Court Act,
cannot now be amended by the ordinary legislative process. The
situation cries out for clarification, and clarification has now been
18
provided by the Meech Lake Constitutional Accord.

Professor Patrick Monahan, in his own textbook, Constitutional
Law,19 takes exception to the view expressed by Professor Hogg, arguing
that it would render paragraph 42(1)(d) of the Constitution Act, 1982
“completely ineffective in terms of protecting provincial interests” in
relation to the Supreme Court.20 Monahan argues that a contextual and
purposive interpretation would “support the conclusion that section
42(1)(d) must operate so as to limit, in some fashion, the ability of the
federal Parliament to effect changes to the Supreme Court of Canada
without the consent of the provinces”.21 In attempting to determine the
nature and scope of such limits, he adverts to Professor Stephen Scott‟s
observation that the Supreme Court Act and the Rules adopted pursuant
to it deal with such minutiae as the colour of the covers of the parties‟
factums.22 Monahan suggests a “middle ground” between rendering
paragraph 42(1)(d) “nugatory”, and construing that provision as having
constitutionally entrenched every minor detail and measure set out in the
Supreme Court Act and Rules. Invoking the Supreme Court‟s own
analysis in protecting the “fundamental features and key characteristics”
of the Senate from alteration by Parliament in the Upper House
Reference,23 Monahan would see paragraph 42(1)(d) as having entrenched
18

Hogg, Meech Lake, supra, note 16, at 30.
P.J. Monahan, Constitutional Law, 3d ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2006) [hereinafter
“Monahan”].
20
Id., at 193. He continues: “Indeed, the result of Hogg‟s analysis is that Parliament‟s
unilateral power to make fundamental changes to the Court‟s powers or composition cannot be
constrained in the future unless at least seven, and perhaps all ten, provinces agree.”
21
Id., at 194.
22
S.A. Scott, “Pussycat, Pussycat or Patriation and the New Constitutional Amendment
Processes” (1982) 20 U.W.O. L. Rev. 247, at 272; see also Scott, “Constitutional Amendment”,
supra, note 17, at 262: Professor Scott argued that
The Supreme Court of Canada will likely be disposed to adopt an intermediate position,
attributing to some of the federal statutory provisions a „constitutional‟ character, and to
others not. This would give an entrenched status to the essential elements of the court‟s
character, without involving the inconvenience which an implied repeal of the pertinent
portion of section 101 would entail.
23
Re Authority of Parliament in relation to the Upper House, [1979] S.C.J. No. 94, [1980]
1 S.C.R. 54 (S.C.C.).
19
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“only those key characteristics of the Court that implicate fundamental
provincial interests”.24
Such key characteristics would include the status of the Court as a
general court of appeal for Canada and a superior court of record; the
number of judges of the Court; the requirement that three members of
the Court be appointed from the bar of Quebec; and the mode of
appointment, tenure, and removal of its judges. 25

Professor Monahan provides further criticism of the anomalies
produced by the view expressed by Professor Hogg that the list of
instruments entrenched as part of the Constitution of Canada through
subsection 52(2) of the Constitution Act, 1982 (and the schedule thereto)
is a closed one. Treating subsection 52(2) as exhaustive of the meaning
of the term, “[t]he Constitution of Canada”, for the purposes of that
section (supremacy and entrenchment) also means that the Supreme
Court Act does not come within the definition of the Constitution of
Canada and therefore, paragraph 41(d) of the Constitution Act, 1982
leaves unprotected from further legislative change the provisions of the
Supreme Court Act that currently provide that three of the nine judges of
the Court must come from the Bar of Quebec.
For example, Quebec‟s guaranteed representation on the Supreme
Court could be eliminated without its consent, through an ordinary
statute passed by the Parliament of Canada. Moreover, the only way
that Quebec could obtain constitutional protection against this kind of
unilateral federal change in its Supreme Court representation would be
to obtain the agreement of all the other provinces.26

Professor Monahan calls this result “doubly anomalous” when
analyzed in light of the protections afforded by the Part V amending
procedures taken as a whole, and what he sees as the basic purpose of the
procedures:
The underlying purpose of the amending procedure, in other words, is
to protect the provinces from having their rights or privileges
negatively affected without their consent. This includes provincial
interests in the design and operation of key national institutions such as
the Senate and the House of Commons. Yet, by treating section 41(d)
as ineffective, the provinces are granted absolutely no protection when
it comes to the Supreme Court, a key institution of the federation. In
24
25
26

Monahan, supra, note 19, at 194.
Id.
Id., at 181.
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my view, this interpretation is inconsistent with the underlying purpose
of Part V.27

Professors Henri Brun, Guy Tremblay and Eugénie Brouillet invoke
a similar construction of the Part V amending procedures when it comes
to the meaning to be attributed to paragraph 41(d):
Il est possible d‟imaginer que l‟article 41d) n‟ait voulu imposer
l‟unanimité qu‟à d‟éventuels ajouts à la Constitution du Canada portant
sur la composition de la Cour suprême, sans prétendre régir sa
composition actuelle résultant de la Loi sur la Cour suprême. Cette
vision des choses nous semble toutefois pas celle qu‟il faille privilégier,
pour la raison essentielle qu‟elle équivaut à protéger la compétence
fédérale exclusive de régir à sa guise la composition de la Cour
suprême. Le Québec, en particulier, n‟a pas pu vouloir cela lorsqu‟il a
consenti à la formule en question en avril 1981; la présence de trois
juges civilistes sur neuf à la Cour suprême lui est trop importante. Plus
généralement, il semble certain que l‟intention des divers acteurs
politiques à l‟époque du rapatriement ne se situait pas à un deuxième
degré d‟abstraction et qu‟elle consistait bien à enchâsser la composition
de la Cour suprême.28

This view of the purpose of paragraph 41(d) (and 42(1)(d)) of the
Constitution Act, 1982 — a view informed (if not coloured) by
considerations of appropriate policy outcomes (i.e., achieving
constitutional protection for the judges from Quebec) — must be
balanced with the fact that both before and after 1982, attempts to
entrench substantively the composition and essential characteristics of
the Supreme Court in the Constitution of Canada were proposed and
failed to be ratified. Indeed, one of the government of Quebec‟s five
basic constitutional demands after 1982 was the entrenchment of the
27

Id.
H. Brun, G. Tremblay & E. Brouillet, Droit constitutionnel, 5th ed. (Cowansville:
Éditions Yvon Blais, 2008), at 233-34. Professor Benoît Pelletier, in his major study of the amending
procedures, La modification constitutionnelle au Canada (Scarborough: Carswell, 1996), at 74, sides
with Hogg: “nous partageons l‟opinion du professeur Hogg […] et estimons que le terme
« Constitution du Canada » à l‟article 52 de la Loi de 1982 ne doit couvrir que les textes figurant à
l‟annexe de cette loi.” Statutes that are not listed in the schedule, such as the Supreme Court Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26 and the Official Languages Act, S.C. 1985, c. 31 (4th Supp.), “ne doivent pas
être considérés comme faisant partie de la Constitution du Canada pour les fins de la procédure e
modification constitutionnelle établie dans la Partie V de la Loi de 1982, et ce, ni en totalité ni en
partie”. He adds (in fn. 229, at 75): “Nous ne partageons donc pas l‟opinion des auteurs Brun et
Tremblay, […] voulant que certaines des dispositions de la Loi sur la Cour suprême soient soumises
à la Partie V de la Loi de 1982 alors que d‟autres ne le seraient pas. Une telle position, en effet,
ajoute inutilement de l‟incertitude à la question de savoir comment cette loi pourra être modifiée
dans l‟avenir.”
28
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Court‟s composition as respects the judges from Quebec. The 1987
Meech Lake Constitutional Accord would have amended the
Constitution Act, 1867 to provide, immediately after section 101 thereof,
new sections 101A to 101E. Section 101A would have expressly
continued and constituted the Court; section 101B would have
determined the qualifications of persons who may be appointed judges,
and would have required that at least three judges come from Quebec;
section 101C would have provided for the appointment process; section
101D would have applied sections 99 and 100 (dealing with tenure and
salaries, etc.) of the Constitution Act, 1867 to the judges of the Supreme
Court; and section 101E would have preserved the power of Parliament
to make laws under section 101, subject to the provisions of sections
101A to 101D.
In light of the failure of the ratification of the Meech Lake Accord‟s
constitutional amendments under section 41 of the Constitution Act, 1982
and other attempts to amend the Constitution to provide expressly for the
Supreme Court‟s composition, organization and maintenance,29 it is
difficult to believe that the Court would, under the guise of judicial
interpretation, be prepared to read these types of provisions directly into
the text of the Constitution.

III. FOCUSING UPON THE COURT RATHER THAN THE
SUPREME COURT ACT OR THE AMENDING PROCEDURES
That said, it is unnecessary, in the context of the present paper, to
come to a definitive view on whether the Supreme Court Act, the
Supreme Court and its composition or other basic characteristics of the
Court have been entrenched through sections 41 and 42 of the
Constitution Act, 1982. There has been no formal judicial consideration
of the effect of paragraphs 41(d) and 42(1)(d) of the Constitution Act,
1982 in any case law to date, so purportedly definitive pronouncements
in this unsettled area should be treated with caution. It may well be that,
whatever the differences of scholars as to details and approach in terms
of the extent to which (if at all) the Supreme Court Act or its basic
principles and provisions have been entrenched, the Supreme Court itself
is now beyond the reach of abolition by Parliament under section 101 of
the Constitution Act, 1867. The fact that there is no longer a higher (or
29

See also the provisions of the 1992 Charlottetown Accord, which would have made
similar amendments in relation to s. 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867.
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alternative) court of appeal in the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council; the emerging doctrine of the separation of powers as a
fundamental constitutional principle, even in a parliamentary system of
government; the central, structural role played by the Court as the
general court of appeal for Canada; its pivotal place in the judicial
hierarchy; and the very mention of the Court in sections 41 and 42 of the
Constitution Act, 1982, all argue for its continued constitutional
existence despite the plenary character of the legislative power conferred
upon Parliament under section 101 of the Act of 1867.
The views exemplified by Professors Hogg and Monahan,
respectively, each have some merit. However, in their focus on the status
of the Supreme Court Act, on the one hand, and the constitutional
amending procedures on the other, they also tend to lead to unwanted
consequences. The view that it is open to Parliament, as a matter of law,
to repeal the Supreme Court Act and thereby to abolish the Court, begs a
legal response asserting that the Constitution cannot permit the
legislature to interfere so drastically in the judicial sphere.30 On the other
hand, the view that the constitutional amending procedures are nugatory
in their effect if they have not entrenched either the Supreme Court Act,
or else the principal characteristics of the Court, belies the use (or
contemplation) of those procedures in the Meech Lake and Charlottetown
Constitutional Accords, and may also constrain the flexibility of
Parliament‟s power to modernize and improve the Supreme Court Act
and the characteristics of the Court without resorting to complex
constitutional amendments.
Most constitutional scholars would now concede the point that the
Supreme Court Act — albeit in many respects an organic instrument and
“constitutional” in the broad sense described by Beetz J. in the
O.P.S.E.U. case (i.e., bearing upon an organ or principle of government)
— is not itself part of the “Constitution of Canada” as that term is
defined in section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982.31 Professor Hogg‟s
point on this score is well taken. Furthermore, most scholars (with some

30
“It is well within the power of the legislature to enact laws, even laws which some would
consider draconian, as long as it does not fundamentally alter or interfere with the relationship
between the courts and the other branches of government”: Babcock v. Canada (Attorney General),
[2002] S.C.J. No. 58, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 3, at para. 57 (S.C.C.), per McLachlin C.J.C.
31
O.P.S.E.U. v. Ontario (Attorney General), [1987] S.C.J. No. 48, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 2
(S.C.C.); see also W.J. Newman, “Defining the Constitution of Canada Since 1982” (2003) 22
S.C.L.R. (2d) 423.
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notable exceptions32) would also be reluctant to recommend that the
courts read the Supreme Court Act into the apparently closed list of Acts
and instruments scheduled to the Constitution Act, 1982 — the term
“includes” in subsection 52(2) being unlikely to overcome, in this
regard, the stricture against unauthorized constitutional amendment by
(inter alia) robust judicial construction embodied in subsection 52(3):
“Amendments to the Constitution of Canada shall be made only in
accordance with the authority contained in the Constitution of Canada.”33
However, if it may be difficult to deny the proposition that the
Supreme Court Act is not itself part of the Constitution of Canada in the
formal sense and is therefore neither supreme law nor constitutionally
entrenched, there would seem to be something inherently unsatisfactory,
from the standpoint of the rule of law and other fundamental
constitutional principles, with the corollary advanced earlier by Professor
Hogg: that if the Supreme Court Act is itself not part of the Constitution
of Canada, then in the fullness of legal theory, the Parliament of Canada
has the legislative competence to abolish the Supreme Court — and
thereby, to eliminate the central organ exercising supreme judicial
power.

32

Incorporating the Supreme Court Act (or parts thereof) into the Constitution by analytical
construction or judicial interpretation has been contemplated by S.A. Scott (see supra, note 22) but
also by R.I. Cheffins, in “The Constitution Act, 1982 and the Amending Formula: Political and
Legal Implications” (1982) 4 S.C.L.R. 43, at 53-54; see also W.R. Lederman, “Constitutional
Procedure and the Return of the Supreme Court of Canada” (1985) 26 Cahiers de droit. These early
writings pre-date the Supreme Court‟s consideration of the meaning of s. 52(2) of the Constitution
Act, 1982 in New Brunswick Broadcasting, infra, note 33.
33
In New Brunswick Broadcasting Co. v. Nova Scotia (Speaker of the House of Assembly),
[1993] S.C.J. No. 2, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 319 (S.C.C.), a majority of the Court refused to treat article 9 of
the English Bill of Rights of 1689 as itself part of the Constitution of Canada, but did accept that the
principle of parliamentary privilege embodied in that provision became part of the Constitution via
the preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867 and its reference to Canada possessing “a Constitution
similar in Principle to that of the United Kingdom”. Stated McLachlin J. (as she then was), at 378:
I accept the spirit of the remarks of Hogg that additions to the 30 instruments set out in
the Schedule to s. 52(2) of the Constitution Act, 1982 might have grave consequences
given the supremacy and entrenchment that is provided for the “Constitution of Canada”
in ss. 52(1) and 52(3). However, as Hogg himself concedes, s. 52(2) is not clearly meant
to be exhaustive. That established, I would be unwilling to restrict the interpretation of
that section in such a way as to preclude giving effect to the intention behind the
preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867, thereby denying recognition to the minimal, but
long recognized and essential, inherent privileges of Canadian legislative bodies.
A similar result was achieved by Lamer C.J.C. in relation to the Act of Settlement of 1701 in
Reference re Provincial Court Judges, [1997] S.C.J. No. 75, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.); the
principle of judicial independence (rather than the provisions of the Act of Settlement) was part of the
Constitution of Canada, through the preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867.
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It is true that Canada got along without a Supreme Court for almost a
decade after Confederation, and that the Court did not truly become
supreme until after the abolition, by Parliament, of appeals to the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council of the United Kingdom.34 However,
the obvious point is precisely that: the supreme appellate function of
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was an integral part of the
Canadian judicial system until it was ultimately displaced by the
Parliament of Canada in favour of the Supreme Court. Canadians could
do without a general court of appeal for Canada as long as the Judicial
Committee continued to play that role. With the abolition of appeals to
the Privy Council, the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of
Canada became essential.
Structural constitutional principles militate in favour of that conclusion.
Canada‟s constitution is primarily a written one, as is typical of a federal
state, where legislative (and executive) powers must be allocated among
the central and local governments. It is generally conceded that the
resolution of legal disputes between governments in respect of the
division of powers requires an impartial and authoritative judicial
arbiter.35 That judicial role has been enhanced since 1982 by the
entrenchment of a constitutional bill of rights and by the express (in the
judicial remedies clause of section 24 of the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms)36 and implied (in the supremacy clause in section 52 of
the Constitution Act, 1982) responsibilities imposed thereby on the courts
as guarantors of constitutional interests and protections.
Moreover, the development of the Supreme Court‟s own understanding
of the basic tenets underlying the written provisions of the Constitution:
— first principles such as federalism; the separation of powers among
34
Appeals in criminal cases were abolished by the Parliament of Canada in 1933 and in
civil cases in 1949. For the jurisprudence relating to the validity of the abolition statutes, see R. v.
Nadan, [1926] A.C. 482 (P.C.), R. v. British Coal Corp., [1935] A.C. 500 (P.C.); Ontario (Attorney
General) v. Canada (Attorney General), [1947] A.C. 127 (P.C.).
35
No less eminent a legal scholar than A.V. Dicey observed, in his Introduction to the
Study of the Law of the Constitution (London: Macmillan & Co., 1889), at 157: “For the essential
characteristics of federalism — the supremacy of the constitution — the distribution of powers —
the authority of the judiciary — reappear, though no doubt with modifications, in every true federal
state.” Calling the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council “the true Supreme Court of the
Dominion”, Dicey continued: “In Canada, as in the United States, the Courts inevitably become the
interpreters of the Constitution.” For contemporary scholarship, consider Donna Greschner, “The
Supreme Court, Federalism, and Metaphors of Moderation” (2001) 79 Can. Bar Rev. 47; A. Wayne
MacKay, “The Supreme Court of Canada and Federalism: Does / Should Anyone Care Anymore?”
(2001) 80 Can. Bar Rev. 241; and Bruce Ryder, “The End of Umpire? Federalism and Judicial
Restraint” (2006) 34 S.C.L.R. (2d) 345.
36
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, supra, note 5.
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the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government; judicial
independence; and constitutionalism itself — lend further support to the
idea that a supreme court is necessary to ensure respect for, and the
fulfilment of, core constitutional values and ideals.

IV. CONSTRUING SECTION 101 OF THE CONSTITUTION ACT, 1867
AND THE STATUS OF THE COURT
How do these principles relate, in the context of the question of the
constitutional status of the Supreme Court, to another basic constitutional
principle: parliamentary sovereignty? Principles such as the rule of law
cannot normally negate the validity of statutes enacted by Parliament or a
provincial legislature, respectively, pursuant to a constitutional grant of
legislative power under sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act,
1867.37 Section 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867 is itself a plenary and
continuing grant of legislative power: the Parliament of Canada “may,
notwithstanding anything in this Act, from Time to Time provide for the
Constitution, Maintenance, and Organization of a General Court of
Appeal for Canada”, as well as for the establishment of additional courts
for the “better Administration of the Laws of Canada”. Section 101
clearly provides (“notwithstanding anything in this Act”) for an ongoing
legislative role (Parliament may legislate “from Time to Time”) in
relation to the Supreme Court, just as the Congress of the United States
has made provision, from time to time, for matters relating to the
Supreme Court of the United States — but it may be argued plausibly
that the thrust of section 101 is to grant Parliament the power to
establish, and thereafter to maintain, a general appellate court for
Canada. In other words, section 101 — on its own terms (“Constitution,
Maintenance, and Organization”) and read in light of structural
constitutional principles (federalism, constitutionalism, the separation of
powers and an independent judiciary) as well as recent constitutional
history (the entrenchment of a Charter of Rights, an express supremacy
clause, and comprehensive amending procedures) — does not give rise
to a legislative power on the part of Parliament to abolish the Supreme
Court or to diminish its status as a general court of appeal for Canada or
— in light of the express mention of the term, “Supreme Court of
37
See W.J. Newman, “The Principles of the Rule of Law and Parliamentary Sovereignty in
Constitutional Theory and Litigation” (2005) 16 N.J.C.L. 175; P.W. Hogg & C.R. Zwibel, “The
Rule of Law in the Supreme Court of Canada” (2005) 55 U.T.L.J. 715.
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Canada” in Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982, its status and core
attributes as the supreme court of the country.
A progressive and purposive construction of section 101 of the
Constitution Act, 1867 in relation to the essential role played by the
Supreme Court as the pre-eminent judicial institution in our constitutional
system of government, would avoid many of the problems encountered
by focusing the debate about the status of the Court on whether the
Supreme Court Act is itself part of the Constitution of Canada and
whether paragraphs 41(d) and 42(1)(d) of the Constitution Act, 1982
have themselves entrenched the Court and its composition. It would
permit the Parliament of Canada to continue to exercise an important and
practical legislative function in modernizing and protecting elements of
the Court by statute from time to time, while leaving to the amending
procedures further express and entrenched constitutional enhancements
and protections.
On this theory, the baseline of what a “General Court of Appeal for
Canada” consists of will have been crystallized by the express mention
of “the Supreme Court of Canada” in the Part V amending procedures of
the Constitution Act, 1982: in other words, the essential attributes of the
Supreme Court as they existed in 1982. On the delicate question of the
composition of the Court, this view would include among those essential
characteristics the continuing presence of three judges drawn from the
bench and bar of Quebec, given their significance to the recognition of
the civil law tradition in Canada and, more broadly, to Canadian
federalism and diversity. A further statutory enhancement by Parliament
— such as, for instance, a recognition in law of what is now the practice:
that three of the other nine judges are appointed from the bench and bar
of Ontario, one from the Atlantic provinces and two from the Western
provinces — might also be permissible, as might (although this could be
argued either way) an increase in the total number of judges.38
Construing section 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867 as protecting
the constitution, maintenance and organization of the Supreme Court as a
38
Quaere whether a Private Member‟s Bill currently under study before the House of
Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, Bill C-232, An Act to amend the
Supreme Court Act (understanding the official languages) relates indirectly to the composition of the
Court, or simply imposes a further condition precedent on potential nominees to the bench. The Bill
would amend s. 5 of the Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26 so as to provide, in addition to the
current requirement that “[a]ny person may be appointed a judge who is or has been a judge of a
superior court of a province or a barrister or advocate of at least ten years standing at the bar of a
province” (which would become s. 5(1)), “any person referred to in subsection (1) may be appointed
a judge who understands French or English without the assistance of an interpreter.”
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general and supreme appellate court for Canada, while permitting
Parliament to continue to enact amendments to the Supreme Court Act
from time to time to modernize and enhance the functions, attributes and
administration of the Court, in keeping with its essential role and status,
would respect the principle of the separation of powers and would also
leave the amending procedures of paragraphs 41(d) and 42(1)(d) of the
Constitution Act, 1982 to the task of formal and express constitutional
amendment of the type contemplated by the Meech Lake and Charlottetown
Accords. This would also maintain the integrity of those formal processes
of constitutional amendment, which impose strict requirements for
ratification by the federal legislative houses and the provincial legislative
assemblies.39
On a liberal application of this theory, it might still be open to an
aggressively minded Parliament to abrogate the provisions of the
Supreme Court Act; however, such repeal would be not only ill
considered but a vexatious exercise in futility, because it would be
ineffective to abolish the Court itself. On a stricter view, Parliament‟s
legislative power under section 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867 is
limited to establishing and maintaining a general court of appeal for
Canada, and, at least since 1982, is to be exercised in a manner consistent
with the basic attributes of the Supreme Court of Canada as that institution
stood then constituted, although it remains within the competence of
Parliament to adjust the framework legislation and the administrative
and regulatory details governing the organization of the Court from time
to time.
It is well to note that even the Mother of Parliaments, the Parliament
of the United Kingdom, has, through the enactment of the Constitutional
Reform Act 2005, provided for the establishment of a Supreme Court of
the United Kingdom.40 It joins, in this respect, the Supreme Court of
New Zealand established by the Parliament of that dominion in 2004.41
There is good reason to believe that modern constitutionalism —
particularly in a federal state with a largely written constitution, such as
39
The amending procedures serve a dual purpose: to permit constitutional amendments
where the legal requirements of the formulae have been met, through the authorizing resolutions of
the relevant federal legislative chambers and provincial assemblies; (2) to protect constitutional
guarantees and entrenched provisions from change where the requisite conditions of Part V have not
been met: W.J. Newman, “Living with the Amending Procedures: Prospects for Future
Constitutional Reform in Canada” (2007) 37 S.C.L.R. (2d) 383, at 385-86.
40
2005, c. 4 (U.K.); see esp. Part 3 of the Act. The U.K. Supreme Court will become
operational in October 2009.
41
Supreme Court Act 2003 (N.Z.), which came into force on January 1, 2004.
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Canada and the United States — contemplates the continued existence
and vitality of a supreme judicial institution and appellate court.
Interpreting section 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867 in keeping with
that end is one means of ensuring that objective.

